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ABSTRACT—Algorithmic collusion has the potential to transform future
markets, leading to higher prices and consumer harm. And yet, algorithmic
collusion may remain undetected and unchallenged, in particular, when it is
used to facilitate conscious parallelism. The risks posed by such undetected
collusion have been debated within antitrust circles in Europe, the US, and
beyond. Some economists, however, downplay algorithmic tacit collusion
as unlikely, if not impossible. “Keep calm and carry on,” they argue, as
future prices will remain competitive. This paper explores the rise of
algorithmic tacit collusion and responds to those who downplay it, by
pointing to new emerging evidence and the gap between law and this
particular economic theory. We explain why algorithmic tacit collusion is
not only possible but warrants the increasing concerns of many enforcers.
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INTRODUCTION
As one law firm noted in 2018, “[p]rice algorithms are clearly the
‘talk of the town’ in the European competition law community these
days.”1 During the summer of 2018, the law firm noted,
[B]oth the Federal Cartel Office and the Austrian Federal Competition
Authority have addressed the question of whether the use of price algorithms
can lead to excessive ticket prices in the airline industry. . . . [T]he French
Autorité de la Concurrence and the Federal Cartel Office announced the
launch of a joint research project to investigate algorithms and their
implications on competition.2

The European Commission is seeking input on these issues, as well.3
The German Monopolies Commission, in its 2018 report, recommended the
government “to systematically investigate markets with algorithm-based
pricing for adverse effects on competition.”4 Among the key concerns
raised are pricing algorithms that help competitors elude detection for their
price-fixing or algorithms that – with or without the help of humans –
tacitly collude. With tacit collusion (also known as, “conscious
parallelism”), there is not any illegal agreement or even any contact or
communication among the competitors. Instead, each competitor acts
unilaterally, in response to the behavior of its rivals, to raise price above
competitive levels.
In our earlier writing, we outlined four key scenarios where
algorithms may be used to facilitate collusion,5 and in 2016, we provided
further context and analysis in our book, Virtual Competition: The Promise

1 Christian Ritz & Lorenz Marx, Digital Competition Policy on the Move: Price Algorithms in the
German Monopolies Commission’s Spotlight – European Commission Launches Consultation Process,
HOGAN LOVELLS: FOCUS ON REGULATION (July 11, 2018), https://www.hlregulation.
com/2018/07/11/digital-competition-policy-on-the-move-price-algorithms-in-the-german-monopoliescommissions-spotlight-european-commission-launches-consultation-process/ [https://perma.cc/HRG828ZN].
2 Id.
3 See Jean Tirole, Shaping Competition Policy in the Era of Digitization, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 17,
2019), https://webcast.ec.europa.eu/shaping-competition-policy-in-the-era-of-digitisation [https://perma
.cc/ZSL6-CXQP] (advance video to 03:30:27).
4 Press Release, Monopolkommission [German Monopolies Commission], Digital Change
Requires Legal Adjustments Regarding Price Algorithms, The Media Sector and the Supply of
Medicines, MONOPOLIES COMM’N (July 3, 2018), https://www.monopolkommission.de/images/
HG22/PM_HG_2018_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW5S-UB8Z].
5 Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit
Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1775, 1782-84 (2017); see also Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke,
Emerging Antitrust Threats and Enforcement Actions in the Online World, 13 COMPETITION L. INT’L
125, 129 (2017).
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and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy.6 Finally, we engaged in
further thematic development in our submissions to the U.K. House of
Lords7 and OECD,8 and testimony at the Federal Trade Commission
hearings on algorithmic collusion.9
Broadly, we have gleaned general consensus over our first two
scenarios: Messenger, where humans agree to collude by fixing the price
for their competing products and use algorithms to facilitate their collusion;
10 and Hub and Spoke, where a common intermediary facilitates pricefixing among competitors who use the intermediary’s services.11 Indeed,
the European Commission and United States antitrust authorities, among
others, raised concerns that algorithms could facilitate collusion12 and have
6

ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF
(2016).
7 Written evidence from Professor Ariel Ezrachi and Professor Maurice E. Stucke Submitted to
Select Committee on European Union Internal Market Subcommittee, Online Platforms and the EU
Digital Single Market, U.K. PARLIAMENT (Oct. 16, 2015), http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/online-platforms-and-theeu-digital-single-market/written/23223.html [https://perma.cc/6NDQ-TEVF]; SELECT COMMITTEE ON
EUROPEAN UNION, ONLINE PLATFORMS AND THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET, 2015-16, HL 129 passim
(UK).
8 Note by Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Algorithmic Collusion: Problems and CounterMeasures, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)25 (May 31, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/
DAF/COMP/WD(2017)25/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/53AY-V74Y].
9 Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st
Century - Day 2, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N 19-84 (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_events/1418693/ftc_hearings_session_7_transcript_day_2_11-14-18_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5V8Y-NQXA].
10 Here humans agree to collude and turn to pricing algorithms to help implement their cartel. The
commonly programmed algorithm can reduce the incentives of cartel members to deviate and thereby
contribute to the cartel’s stability, by implementing the agreed upon price, improving the detection of
any cheating from this price, and enabling the other cartel members’ algorithms to quickly retaliate by
matching or lowering price. From an enforcement perspective, the law is straight-forward, but the
agency’s detection of the cartel may be harder, when the use of similar pricing algorithms reduces the
need of humans to regularly communicate to monitor their cartel.
11 At times, a seller may outsource its ongoing dynamic pricing adjustments to a third party whose
advanced algorithms continually process market data to update prices and optimize profits. Such
agreements enable a seller that lacks the algorithms and market data to benefit from dynamic pricing.
When competitors increasingly use the same third-party pricing algorithm, one company, the “hub,” can
materially impact the industry price and dampen competition. See Opinion of Advocate General
Szpunar delivered on 11 May 2017, Case C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber Systems
Spain SL, ECLI:EU:C:2017:364, at 13 n. 23 (noting that “the use by competitors of the same algorithm
to calculate the price is not in itself unlawful, but might give rise to hub-and-spoke conspiracy concerns
when the power of the platform increases”); see also Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 822-27
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that plaintiffs plausibly alleged a hub-and-spoke conspiracy in which drivers
sign up for Uber precisely on the understanding that the other drivers were agreeing to the same pricing
algorithm, and in which drivers’ agreements with Uber would be against their own interests were they
acting independently), reconsideration denied in part, 185 F. Supp. 3d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
12 Note
from the European Union, Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc.
DAF/COMP/WD(2017)12, at 7 (June 14, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD
THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY

219

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

opened investigations on these scenarios.13 Most policy makers recognize
how “pricing algorithms may make price fixing attempts more frequent and
potentially more difficult to detect.”14 Most say “with confidence . . . that
the rise of pricing algorithms and AI software will require changes in our
enforcement practices;” and most would agree that enforcers “need to
understand how algorithms and AI software work in particular markets.”15
What has sparked debate, however, are our third and fourth scenarios,
namely Tacit Collusion on Steroids – where humans program their pricing
algorithms to monitor and respond to rivals’ pricing and other keys terms
of sale, and they know that the likely outcome will be conscious parallelism
and higher prices (without the need of the rivals to communicate with each
other or otherwise enter into an illegal cartel agreement), and Artificial
Intelligence and the Digital Eye – where we predict that advances in
machine learning and increases in market transparency may eventually
enable self-learning algorithms to unilaterally determine the profitmaximizing price. Under the right market conditions, the self-learning
algorithms may independently arrive at tacit collusion, without the
knowledge or intent of their human programmers.
(2017)12/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/9CCF-S72G]; Note by United States, Algorithms and Collusion,
OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)41, at 6 (May 26, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/
COMP/WD(2017)41/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/8U89-NJL8] (“[I]f competing firms each entered into
separate agreements with a single firm (for instance a platform) to use a particular pricing algorithm,
and the evidence showed they did so with the common understanding that all of the other competitors
would use the identical algorithm, that evidence could be used to prove an agreement among the
competitors that violates U.S. antitrust law.”). But if the competitors independently and unknowingly
adopted the same or similar pricing algorithms, this would “unlikely to lead to antitrust liability even if
it makes interdependent pricing more likely.” Id. An interesting issue is whether the competitors would
be liable if they intentionally but unilaterally adopted the same algorithm knowing that this would make
interdependent pricing more likely.
13 See, e.g., Daniel Mandrescu, When Algorithmic Pricing Meets Concerted Practices- the Case of
Partneo, CORE BLOG (June 7, 2018), http://coreblog.lexxion.eu/when-algorithmic-pricing-meetsconcerted-practices-the-case-of-partneo/ [https://perma.cc/H6LS-NFFF] (discussing the car makers’ use
of Accenture’s car part pricing algorithm, Partneo, which was “designed to identify the maximum price
consumers would be willing to pay for (visible) cars parts such as fenders or bumpers where there is
almost no inter or intra brand competition” and how during the period of 2008 to 2013 the five major
carmakers “boosted their revenues by more than 1 billion dollars thanks to using Partneo, which
increased the prices of their inventory with 15% on average”); Tom Bergin & Laurence Frost, RPTINSIGHT-Software and Stealth: How Carmakers Hike Spare Parts Prices, REUTERS (June 4, 2018,
1:02 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/autos-software-pricing/rpt-insight-software-and-stealthhow-carmakers-hike-spare-parts-prices-idUSL5N1T60H9 [https://perma.cc/HTU6-DFZV]. No formal
findings, however, have been found against the carmakers or Accenture.
14 Terrell McSweeny, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Algorithms and Coordinated Effects,
Remarks at U. Oxford Ctr. for Competition L. Pol’y, U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N (May 22, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1220673/mcsweeny__oxford_cclp_remarks_-_algorithms_and_coordinated_effects_5-22-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2RNT969].
15 Id.
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These two categories raise significant policy issues, as they suggest
that in the future, pricing algorithms may facilitate higher (supracompetitive) prices, without triggering antitrust intervention. Furthermore,
such algorithmic tacit collusion can arise in markets where such tacit
collusion previously among humans would have been unstable. As we
elaborate below, the possible use of algorithms for price coordination,
below the antitrust radar screen, raises challenging policy questions.
Among them:
 Should our current antitrust policy towards conscious
parallelism (which was designed based on human interaction)
apply when price optimization algorithms enhance the
competitors’ ability to tacitly collude?
 Is the legal concept of agreement outdated for computer
algorithms? Are our current antitrust laws sufficient to deter
and prevent algorithmic tacit collusion?
 How can the agencies identify when algorithmic collusion
occurs, especially when pricing is dynamic?
 What additional measures should be considered to reduce the
additional risks associated with the industry-wide use of price
optimization algorithms?
 In what way should firms be obligated to integrate ethics and
legality into a computer program?
 Should companies have an affirmative duty to program the
computers so as to not tacitly collude?
While competition agencies and international organizations have
debated these challenging questions, some have argued that the issue is
moot. Several economists put forward the claim that the likelihood, in
practice, of tacit collusion in either the brick-and-mortar economy or digital
economy, is minimal. They argue that algorithmic tacit collusion should
not pose any concern because collusion is unsustainable without supporting
communications between humans.16 According to this view, tacit collusion
with three or more rivals - whether by algorithms or humans - is unlikely,
16 Ulrich Schwalbe, Algorithms, Machine Learning, and Collusion, 14 J. COMPETITION L. ECON.
568, 600 (2019); Thibault Schrepel, Here’s Why Algorithms Are NOT (Really) A Thing,
CONCURRENTIALISTE (May 15, 2017), https://leconcurrentialiste.com/2017/05/15/algorithms-basedpractices-antitrust/ [https://perma.cc/P4CX-XVK8]; Kai-uwe Kühn & Steve Tadelis, Algorithm
Collusion, CRESSE (2017), http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/2017_sps5_pr2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y2G5-5A4K]; Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and Consumer Protection in the
21st Century - Day 1, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/public_events/1418693/ftc_hearings_session_7_transcript_day_1_11-13-18_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EZZ8-BRYX]; Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and
Consumer Protection in the 21st Century - Day 2, supra note 9.
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as the “coordination problems are hard to solve without communication,
even in simple static games.”17 These communications, the argument goes,
can be captured under current antitrust laws such as Article 101 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) – and US
antitrust provision – Section 1 of the Sherman Act. And so, because pricing
algorithms cannot tacitly collude without rivals actually communicating
with each other, the antitrust laws would capture these communications
among humans, and thus the current antitrust tools would suffice for the
digital economy.
In this paper, we elaborate on the phenomenon of algorithmic tacit
collusion and consider it in light of the claim that, in practice, such
collusion is unlikely without communications. We note how this claim has
not slowed the enforcers’ interest and momentum to tackle the policy issues
underlying algorithmic tacit collusion.
In Part I, we outline the theory and the way pricing algorithms, in
specific market conditions, may foster tacit collusion (also referred to as
conscious parallelism or oligopolistic price coordination).
In Part II, we tackle the instability of tacit collusion. We consider the
claim that absent some human communication, tacit collusion is inherently
unsustainable. This belief is based on experimental economics and the
difficulty of sustaining tacit collusion under certain laboratory conditions.
According to this view, the model of tacit collusion will rarely manifest
itself in the real world without some supporting communication.
We explain how the economic observations at the core of this claim
diverge from antitrust law and enforcement policies. When observing the
market reality, courts and enforcers on both sides of the Atlantic have seen,
in the brick-and-mortar economy, durable tacit collusion that seemingly
occurs without any human communication between rivals. Basically,
competitors, watching each other like hawks, steadily raise their prices
above competitive levels. Because this durable tacit collusion can occur
without any human communication, the courts require from the enforcer or
private plaintiff proof of express collusion, namely, sufficient direct or
circumstantial evidence of an agreement or illicit communication among
the competitors. Absent this evidence, the courts say that the rivals’ parallel
behavior is legal. Because the conduct is otherwise legal, the primary
mechanism to prevent tacit collusion is merger review.18 To put it simply,
17

See Kühn & Tadelis, supra note 16; see also Schwalbe, supra note 16, at 592.
As we discuss infra in Part II, enforcers, when appraising proposed acquisitions, may block
mergers that significantly increase the risk of tacit collusion. They expect “industry awareness” would
allow rivals to engage in conscious parallelism post-merger without the need of any illicit
communications.
18
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enforcers and antitrust plaintiffs search hard for evidence of express
collusion and communication, but these parties and courts ultimately
recognize that anticompetitive parallel behavior can arise without
communications among the rivals, and thus, comfortably occur within the
zone of legality. Indeed, this parallel behavior among competitors happens
with sufficient frequency that neither the EU nor US law presume any
illicit communication.
Part III addresses the debate as to the added risk offered by algorithms
(without express communication). We note how humans may program
algorithms to reflect the logic behind conscious parallelism - punish
deviations and follow price increases. We note how the use of similar
algorithms by competitors and the ability to identify the strategy employed
by others, may further stabilize conscious parallelism. Importantly, we
explain that when executed carefully, and absent illicit communication,
these unilateral strategies would not trigger antitrust intervention under
current laws.
As part of this discussion, we also consider possible future
technologies and the capacity of self-learning algorithms to adopt a
strategy, which may lead to price increases (absent illegal collusion). The
question here is whether in some future markets, tacit collusion could be
sustained without human intervention.
In Part IV we offer policy makers tools to better understand the risks
of algorithmic tacit collusion. Interestingly, some scholars, taking up our
suggestion to develop algorithmic tacit collusion incubators, are doing just
that, and we report some of their recent findings. While still in the early
stages of research, their findings, which illustrate the possibility for
algorithmic tacit collusion, suggest that competition authorities have
reasonable grounds for their concerns.
This issue is both timely and important. If an antitrust agency accepts
the view that tacit collusion is impossible without human communication,
then it need not worry about algorithms tacitly colluding. This can play out
two ways. First, rather than keep a close eye on these technological
developments and consider potential policy responses, the enforcer would,
as some urge, do nothing. It will not develop algorithmic tacit collusion
incubators or conduct market inquiries. It will not even distinguish between
legitimate human tacit collusion and enhanced algorithmic tacit collusion,
nor would it consider what forms of enhancement may be caught as
facilitating practices or signaling, or which action may qualify as
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collusion.19 In short, the agency would continue with its leniency program
for price fixers20 and sniff out cases where humans still conspire.
Second, the agency’s merger review will remain incomplete, as it will
not appreciate the increased likelihood for tacit collusion in industries
dominated by pricing algorithms. At present, agencies lack good predictive
models of when a merger significantly increases the likelihood of tacit or
express collusion. As one economist explained it to the entering Honors
Program lawyers at the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division in the
mid 1990s, “the merger occurs and s*** happens.” Not surprisingly,
merger review in recent decades has primarily focused on unilateral effects,
which are relatively easier to model and estimate.21 However, as more
markets become more concentrated and more susceptible to tacit collusion,
the harm from ignoring (or downplaying) this risk in merger review
increases.
I.

ALGORITHMIC TACIT COLLUSION – THE BASE CONDITIONS

Let us first consider the general consensus on tacit collusion.
Everyone agrees that it is a challenging area for antitrust enforcement, as it
leads to an anticompetitive outcome (namely, higher prices, reduced
output, or allocated markets) without any illegal agreement among
competitors.22 As the OECD noted, “Although there is great variance in
how jurisdictions interpret the notion of agreement, they traditionally
require some sort of proof of direct or indirect contact showing that firms

19

Joseph E. Harrington Jr, Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous PriceSetting Agents, 14 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 331 (2018).
20 See generally Corporate Leniency Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/
atr/corporate-leniency-policy [https://perma.cc/DSU8-MR9V].
21 See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate, The Merger Review Process in the Federal Trade Commission from
1989 to 2016 (Feb. 28, 2018) (unpublished working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955987
[https://perma.cc/A9QS-VLK8] (identifying for FTC mergers a trend toward unilateral effects analysis
and increase in efficiency findings after 1994, although dropping for challenged mergers after 2004).
22
See, e.g., Background Note by the Secretariat, Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc.
DAF/COMP(2017)4, at 17 (June 9, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2017)4/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/29VF-2RFT] (noting that tacit collusion “refers to forms of anti-competitive coordination which can be achieved without any need for an explicit agreement, but which competitors
are able to maintain by recognising their mutual interdependence. In a tacitly collusive context, the noncompetitive outcome is achieved by each participant deciding its own profit-maximising strategy
independently of its competitors”); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 227 (1993) (describing “the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated
market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing,
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with
respect to price and output decisions” and subsequently unilaterally set their prices above the
competitive level); Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, OECD
(1993), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF68-G4N5].
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have not acted independently from each other (the so-called, ‘meeting of
the minds’).”23
tacit collusion has taken another dimension with the proliferation of
pricing algorithms. Many competition authorities recognize the risk that
algorithms can facilitate and enhance tacit collusion. The OECD in 2016,
for example, commented that these “strategies may pose serious challenges
to competition authorities in the future, as it may be very difficult, if not
impossible, to prove an intention to coordinate prices, at least using current
antitrust tools.”24 With the industry-wide use of computer algorithms and
artificial intelligence, the concern is that algorithmic tacit collusion can
arise in markets where such collusion previously would have been unstable.
The OECD in 2017 reached the following two conclusions:
Firstly, algorithms are fundamentally affecting market conditions, resulting in
high price transparency and high-frequency trading that allows companies to
react fast and aggressively. These changes in digital markets, if taken to a
certain extent, could make collusive strategies stable in virtually any market
structure. Secondly, by providing companies with powerful automated
mechanisms to monitor prices, implement common policies, send market
signals or optimise joint profits with deep learning techniques, algorithms
might enable firms to achieve the same outcomes of traditional hard core
cartels through tacit collusion.25

Similar concerns as to the possible use of algorithms to sustain tacit
collusion have been raised by policy makers and competition agencies
(among them, Germany, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Russia, Israel, and
Australia).26
23

Background Note by the Secretariat, supra note 22, at 17.
Ania Thiemann & Pedro Gonzaga, OECD Competition Div., Background Note by the
Secretariat, Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era, OECD Doc.
DAF/COMP(2016)14 (Oct. 27, 2016), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2016)14/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/KL28-QS5D].
25 Background Note by the Secretariat, supra note 22, at 49-50.
26
See e.g., Antonio Capobianco et al., OECD, Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the
Digital Age, OECD (2017), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Algorithms-and-colllusioncompetition-policy-in-the-digital-age.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KJ2C-AEZQ];
Press
Release,
Monopolkommission, supra note 4; Press Release, Autorité de la Concurrence [French Competition
Authority] & Bundeskartellamt [German Federal Cartel Office], The French Autorité de la
Concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt Launch A Joint Project on Algorithms and Their
Implications on Competition, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (Jun. 19, 2018) (Fr. & Ger.),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/19_06_2018_A
lgorithmen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc/V7GL-LSWD]; Note from Italy,
Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)18, at 2 (2 June 2017), https://one.
oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)18/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/66GU-ZUKV]; Competition
and Mkt. Auth., Pricing algorithms: Economic Working Paper on the Use of Algorithms to Facilitate
Collusion and Personalised Pricing 5 (CMA 94, 2018) (UK), https://assets.publishing.
24
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Algorithmic tacit collusion - that is, the use of algorithms to execute
unilateral and rational reactions to market characteristics that reflect
interdependence - will not affect every (or even most) markets. As Virtual
Competition explores,27 one would expect to observe algorithmic tacit
collusion in markets with several important characteristics:
First, algorithmic tacit collusion likely would arise in concentrated
markets involving homogenous products where the algorithms can monitor,
to a sufficient degree, the competitors’ pricing, other keys terms of sale,
and any deviations from the current equilibrium.28 Software may be used to
report and take independent action when faced with a rival’s deviation, be
it from the supra-competitive or recommended retail price. Conscious
parallelism would be facilitated and stabilized to the extent (i) these the
rivals’ reactions are predictable, or (ii) through repeated interactions, the
firms’ pricing algorithms “could come to ‘decode’ each other, thus
allowing each one to better anticipate the other’s reaction.”29 As the OECD
observed,
The increase of market transparency is not only a result of more data being
available, but also of the ability of algorithms to make predictions and to
reduce strategic uncertainty. Indeed, complex algorithms with powerful data
mining capacity are in a better place to distinguish between intentional
deviations from collusion and natural reactions to changes in market
conditions or even mistakes, which may prevent unnecessary retaliations.30

service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/746353/Algorithms_econ_rep
ort.pdf (noting that “algorithmic pricing may be more likely to facilitate collusion in markets which are
already susceptible to coordination, . . . For these ‘marginal’ markets, the increasing use of data and
algorithmic pricing may be the ‘last piece of the puzzle’ that could allow suppliers to move to a
coordinated equilibrium. There could also be greater scope for coordination where algorithmic pricing
takes place in an online context where price monitoring and response can happen particularly
quickly.”); SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 7, ¶¶ 178-79; Note by the Russian
Federation, Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)22 (May 15, 2017),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)22/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CM2-SSK3];
Report by Israel, Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Israel, OECD Doc. DAFCOMP-AR(2018)9 (May 2, 2018), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2018)9/en/pdf
[ https://perma.cc/KCB9-PM94]; Rod Sims, Chairman, Australian Competition and Consumer Comm’n
[ACCC], The ACCC’s Approach to Colluding Robots, Remarks at “Can robots collude?” Conference,
ACCC (Nov. 16, 2017) (Austl.), https://www.accc.gov.au/speech/the-accc’s-approach-to-colludingrobots [https://perma.cc/54GC-C3BZ].
27 EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 6.
28 Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the
Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5, ¶ 41 [hereinafter EC Merger
Guidelines]; Note from Singapore, Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2017)24,
at 2 (May 31, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)24/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/
7HFV-AYTU].
29 Note from the European Union, supra note 12, at 8.
30 Background Note by the Secretariat, supra note 22, at 20.
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A second important market condition is that once deviation (e.g.,
discounting) is detected, a credible deterrent mechanism exists.31 Unique to
an algorithmic environment is the speed of retaliation.32 Computers can
rapidly detect deviations, and calculate the profit implications of a myriad
of moves and counter-moves to punish deviations.33 The speed of
calculated responses effectively deprives discounting rivals of any
significant sales. The speed also means that the tacit collusion can be
signalled in seconds. The greater the improbability that the first-mover will
benefit from its discounting, the greater the likelihood of tacit collusion.34
Thus, if each algorithm can swiftly match a rival’s discount and eliminate
its incentive to discount in the first place, the threat of future retaliation
keeps the coordination sustainable.35 Noteworthy are the European
Commission’s observations in its 2015-16 e-commerce sector inquiry,
About half of the retailers track online prices of competitors. In addition to
easily accessible online searches and price comparison tools, both retailers and
manufacturers report about the use of specific price monitoring software, often
referred to as ‘spiders’, created either by third party software specialists or by
the companies themselves. This software crawls the internet and gathers large
amounts of price related information. 67% of those retailers that track online
prices use (also) automatic software programmes for that purpose. Larger
companies have a tendency to track online prices of competing retailers more
than smaller ones . . . some software allows companies to monitor several
hundred online shops extremely rapidly, if not in real time . . . Alert
31 EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31; Note from the European Union, supra note 12, at 8
(noting that “tacit collusion requires effective retaliation, which in turn requires spare capacity” as a
“capacity-constrained firm cannot initiate a price war as a means of retaliation to enforce tacit
collusion”).
32 But see EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 53 (“The speed with which deterrent
mechanisms can be implemented is related to the issue of transparency. If firms are only able to observe
their competitors’ actions after a substantial delay, then retaliation will be similarly delayed and this
may influence whether it is sufficient to deter deviation.”).
33 Jill Priluck, When Bots Collude, NEW YORKER (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/
business/currency/when-bots-collude [https://perma.cc/35D6-CMB4].
34
Samuel B. Hwang & Sungho Kim, Dynamic Pricing Algorithm for E-Commerce, in ADVANCES
IN SYSTEMS, COMPUTING SCIENCES AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 149-155 (Khaled Elleithy & Tarek
Sobh eds., 2006); Naoki Abe & Tomonari Kamba, A Web Marketing System with Automatic Pricing, 33
COMPUTER NETWORKS 775 (2000); Lusajo M. Minga et al., Dynamic Pricing: E-Commerce-Oriented
Price Setting Algorithm, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2003 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MACHINE
LEARNING AND CYBERNETICS 893 (2003).
35 Commission Decision of 20 December 2001 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with
the Common Market and the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.2389 Shell/DEA), 2003 O.J. (L 15) 35, ¶
121 (“The retaliation mechanism must be sufficiently plausible and effective to counterbalance the
existing degree of probability and incentives to deviate in the market situation of the individual case . . .
If the parties take the view that retaliation is costly, then the cost of deviating by winning a contract in
deviation from a coordinated pattern in the first place is very high, too, and reduces the likelihood of
such action.”).
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functionalities in price monitoring software allow companies to get alerted as
soon as a retailer’s price is not in line with a predefined price.36

In such an environment, deviation would likely be unprofitable. The
algorithm, in maximizing profits, “would need to decide that it is a better
course of action than competitive pricing, especially if competitive pricing
leads to drastically larger sales volumes.”37
A third condition is that “the reactions of outsiders, such as current
and future competitors not participating in the coordination, as well as
customers, should not be able to jeopardise the results expected from the
coordination.”38 Thus, algorithmic tacit collusion will likely arise in
concentrated markets where buyers cannot exert buyer power (or entice
sellers to defect), sales transactions tend to be “frequent, regular, and
relatively small,”39 and the market in general is characterized by high entry
barriers.
To be clear, no bright line exists of when an industry becomes
sufficiently concentrated for either express or tacit collusion.40 Indeed,
competition agencies often struggle in predicting when a merger may
facilitate tacit collusion. In addition, it is important to stress that the above
36 Commission Staff Working Document: Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry ¶¶
550-551, SWD(2016) 312 final (Sept. 15, 2016); Ecossistemas Digitais, Big Data e Algoritmos [Digital
Ecosystems, Big Data and Algorithms], AUTORIDADE DA CONCORRENCIA [PORTUGUESE COMPETITION
AUTH.] (July 2019), http://www.concorrencia.pt/vPT/Noticias_Eventos/Comunicados/Documents/
Issues%20Paper_%20Ecossistemas%20Digitais%20Big%20Data%20Algoritmos.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J3VC-JELK] (Portuguese competition authority finding that 37% of surveyed companies used specific
software to track competitor prices, and of those 79% adjusted their prices in reaction to the information
obtained through the algorithm).
37 Note by the European Union, supra note 12, at 8. As the OECD noted, “market stagnation
characterised by declining demand and the existence of business cycles may hinder collusion. This is
because firms have strong incentives to profitably deviate when demand is high and reducing the costs
of retaliation in future periods when demand is low.” Background Note by the Secretariat, supra note
22, at 20.
38 EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 41.
39 U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 19 (Mar. 2006), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/801216/download
[https://perma.cc/3ATK-FEEQ].
40 Note, for example, research by Levenstein and Suslow, who offer several explanations for the
lack of a clear empirical relationship between industry concentration and cartels involving express
collusion:

First, this ambiguity may reflect the bias introduced by focusing on cartels that were prosecuted
by the U.S. Department of Justice; cartels with large numbers of firms or that had the active
involvement of an industry association may have been more likely to get caught. Second,
industries with a very small number of firms may be able to collude tacitly without resort to
explicit collusion. Third, concentration is endogenous: collusion may have allowed more firms
to survive and remain in the market.
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 43, 58 (2006).
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phenomenon will affect a select number of markets. Still, when the above
three conditions are present, the risk of tacit collusion is greater.
Importantly, the nature of electronic markets, the availability of data,
and the adoption of similar algorithms by key providers will likely push
some markets that were just outside the realm of tacit collusion into
interdependence.41 Furthermore, in such circumstances, tacit collusion is
likelier to be sustained over time. The market stability needed for tacit
collusion (that is, the absence of significant price deviations from the
tacitly collusive price) is enhanced by the fact that computer algorithms are
unlikely to exhibit human biases.42 Human biases, of course, may be
reflected in the programming code. But biases will not necessarily affect
decisions on a case-by-case basis: a computer does not fear detection and
possible financial penalties or incarceration; nor does it respond in anger.43
Once programmed to execute a certain pricing policy, the computer will
follow the plan. “We’re talking about a velocity of decision-making that
isn’t really human,” said Terrell McSweeny, a former Commissioner with
the US Federal Trade Commission. “All of the economic models are based
on human incentives and what we think humans rationally will do. It’s
entirely possible that not all of that learning is necessarily applicable in
some of these markets.”44
Looking at the market for pricing algorithms, one can see software
vendors who are currently promoting their price optimization algorithms as
a way to avoid price wars and increase prices and margins. Boomerang, for
example, promotes how its price optimization software can “put an end to
price wars before they even begin.”45 As the Italian competition authority
41 One would expect tacit collusion to be feasible with a larger number of participants than
commonly assumed. On the common market assumptions, see generally Reinhard Selten, A Simple
Model of Imperfect Competition, Where Four Are Few and Six Are Many, 2 INT’L J. GAME THEORY 141
(1973); Steffen Huck et al., Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental
Oligopolies’, 53(4) J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 435 (2004).
42 EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 44 (observing that “[c]oordination is more likely to
emerge if competitors can easily arrive at a common perception as to how the coordination should
work. Coordinating firms should have similar views regarding which actions would be considered to be
in accordance with the aligned behaviour and which actions would not.”); Note from Singapore, supra
note 28, at 2.
43 Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Pricing Bots Could Form Cartels and Make Things
More Expensive, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/how-pricing-bots-couldform-cartels-and-make-things-more-expensive [https://perma.cc/D946-EMMP].
44 David Lynch, Policing the Digital Cartels, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.pros.com/
about-pros/news/financial-times-policing-digital-cartels/ [https://perma.cc/M49X-F9SW].
45 Abhijeet Sathe, How Retailers and Brands Can Avoid the Race to the Bottom in Online Pricing,
INTERNET RETAILER (July 9, 2018), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/2018/07/09/how-retailersand-brands-can-avoid-the-race-to-the-bottom-in-online-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/3YDF-EZXY].
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observed, “a number of specialized software developers offer solutions that
allow even small companies to implement ‘strategic’ dynamic pricing
strategies, offering tools to ‘auto-detect pricing wars’ as well as to ‘help
drive prices back up across all competition.’”46
Ultimately, we may see more instances in which similar pricing is not
the result of fierce competition, nor the result of cartel activity, but rather
the result of algorithmic tacit collusion. In those affected markets, one may
witness the same result as express collusion, namely higher prices, with
antitrust enforcers powerless to intervene.
II. THE (IN)STABILITY OF TACIT COLLUSION ABSENT COMMUNICATION
Algorithmic tacit collusion does not pervade the entire digital
economy. It will likely only arise in markets with the characteristics
discussed in Part I. Some critics, however, have questioned the likelihood
of sustainable algorithmic tacit collusion even in these markets. As we
explain below, their arguments, however, have failed to persuade enforcers
and courts with respect to tacit collusion in the brick-and-mortar economy.
Nor are they likely to gain traction in the digital economy.
In discounting the possibility of tacit collusion—whether by humans
or algorithms—several economists point to earlier scholarship, which
highlights the important role of communications in stabilizing and
optimizing collusion.47 They argue that while collusion without
communication may be possible, it is highly unlikely. To their minds, the
increase in transparency, speed in retaliation, and frequency in contacts are
insufficient, even under the three market conditions outlined in Part I.
According to this view, markets with more than two companies need some
kind of explicit coordination (like communications) to enter into and
sustain collusion. In extending the consensus that communication facilitates
alignment (the exact level of communication needed remains unclear),48
and that complex market realities would make collusion and tacit collusion
difficult,49 they argue that absent communication, tacit collusion is unlikely.
Their argument is that “firms are unlikely to develop a mutual

46

Note from Italy, supra note 26, at 3.
See Kühn & Tadelis, supra note 16; Schwalbe, supra note 16.
48 Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication Between Firms, 16
ECON. POL’Y 167 (2001); Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishnay, On Tacit Versus Explicit Collusion (November
3, 2014) (unpublished working paper, Pennsylvania State University), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2518707 [https://perma.cc/X647-778Y].
49 For instance, where the environment is dynamic, demand is uncertain, and competition is not
limited to price. See Edward Green et al., Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly, 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK INT’L
ANTITRUST ECON. 464-97 (2014).
47
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understanding over a collusive strategy absent direct communication in the
initiation phase.”50
According to this view, even in simple markets that exhibit the
characteristics outlined in Part I, a coordination problem exists in markets
with more than two rivals.51 Accordingly, to increase the likelihood of
stable tacit collusion, one would require some form of communication
either to kickstart or sustain the collusion.52
The issue is principal and goes beyond the discussion of algorithmic
collusion. This body of scholarship suggests that, many times, tacit
coordination is unlikely absent some form of illicit communication or
centralized orchestration, even in markets with three rivals.53 These
findings are often based on empirical observations under laboratory
conditions with perfect control and transparency over communications.
Permitting the human subjects to communicate, even briefly, increased
their ability to enter into and sustain coordination, and higher prices with
higher numbers of participants. Absent communications, collusion in these
experiments was difficult, if not impossible, to reach and sustain.
If one accepts this claim, the unavoidable need for communication
among firms would bring the parallel behavior into the realm of antitrust
enforcement and enable agencies to condemn it as an anticompetitive
agreement or concerted practice under well-established case law. Thus, if
algorithms do not (or cannot) “communicate” with one another, then
algorithmic tacit collusion is unlikely.54 Thus, when we observe what
appears to be tacit collusion in these markets, it is likely the result of illegal
human communications.
50 David P. Byrne & Nicolas de Roos, Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline, 109
AM. ECON. REV. 591 (2019) (noting, but not necessarily agreeing, with economic theories of collusion
that “presume collusive agreements are initiated through explicit communication or remaining agnostic
as to how such an understanding emerges”).
51 This is so, since the number of collusive equilibria present in a repeated game defies the simple
alignment of prices. On the role of communications, see Joseph E. Harrington et al., The Relative
Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings,
128 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 251 (2016); Miguel A. Fonseca & Hans-Theo Normann, Explicit vs.
Tacit Collusion–The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1759
(2011); David J. Cooper & Kai-Uwe Kühn, Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for
Collusion, 6 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 247 (2016); Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap
Talk, 10 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 103 (1996); Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic Information
Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1431 (1982).
52 Independent of the discussion here, it has been shown that after a period of collusion supported
by regular communication, firms are able to maintain collusive prices even when communication is no
longer possible. See Fonseca & Normann, supra note 51.
53 See, e.g., Schwalbe, supra note 16.
54 Indeed, the degree of coordination required to align the algorithms would increase the risk of
exposure and civil (and potentially criminal) liability.
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So why have these criticisms failed to persuade enforcers and courts
with respect to tacit collusion in the brick-and-mortar economy, and why
are they unlikely to gain traction in the digital economy?
When competition agencies or courts observe conscious parallelism
that yields supra-competitive pricing, they do not assume that the
competitors must be communicating with each other to jump-start or
sustain the tacit collusion. As we illustrate below, the law in both the US
and EU recognizes that, under certain market conditions, companies can
behave as rational agents and adjust to market characteristics without any
communications. The classic example is one gas station in a remote town
silently reacting to the pricing of its competitors across the street.55 As
courts note, “One does not need an agreement to bring about this kind of
follow-the-leader effect in a concentrated industry.”56 Such phenomenon,
while dampening price competition, is legal and will not trigger
intervention. As the US Supreme Court held:
Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious
parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a
concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their
prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their
shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and
output decisions.57

Both EU and US antitrust law recognizes that anticompetitive
“behavior can sometimes be coordinated without any communication or
other observable and reprehensible behavior.”58 That is why “[t]acit
coordination is feared by antitrust policy even more than express collusion,
for tacit coordination, even when observed, cannot easily be controlled
directly by the antitrust laws.”59 In recognizing this possibility, antitrust
plaintiffs in the EU and US can only attack this tacit collusion indirectly.60
55 In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231, 250 (D. Mass. 2014), aff’d,
842 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting how “[g]as stations in a geographically isolated region, for example,
are likely to engage in parallel supracompetitive pricing behavior because each gas station understands
that matching the highest price in the region encourages prices to stay uniformly high without hurting
demand, and that all local competitors are likely to independently reach the same conclusion.”).
56 See id. (quoting Clamp–All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988)).
57 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993) (citations
omitted); see also F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
58 CITY OF COLUMBIA V. OMNI OUTDOOR ADVERT., INC., 499 U.S. 365, 396 N. 10 (1991)
(QUOTING 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1400, AT 3-4 (REV. ED. 1986)).
59 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 725 (quoting 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 901b2, at 9
(rev. ed. 1998)).
60 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 725; Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 134–35 (2012) (“Consciously parallel conduct does not provide a basis for Section
1 liability under the current state of the law, but the potential for conscious parallelism is relevant to
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One way is for the US Federal Trade Commission to attack practices that
facilitate tacit collusion under its broader powers under Section 5 of the
FTC Act, which it hasn’t actively pursued in the past few decades.61
Another way is to target mergers that foster tacit collusion, precisely
because this behavior, which can be accomplished without any
communications or agreement among rivals, is otherwise difficult to
prosecute.62
With the above in mind, we observe a gap between the law and the
criticism according to which, communication is needed to enter into or
stabilize conscious parallelism, and industry awareness will not suffice to
support a common strategy. The law posits that anticompetitive parallel
behavior among a few firms can naturally occur in markets with the
conditions outlined in Part I. Indeed, it can occur with sufficient frequency
in these markets that the law will not presume any underlying
communications. For if the courts believed that communications often
accompanied conscious parallelism, a legal presumption would likely
arise.63
This notion affects both ex ante merger review and ex post antitrust
enforcement. In the case of merger review, the realization that tacit
collusion may emerge when the market conditions in Part I are present will
justify careful scrutiny of proposed transactions that would foster conscious
merger review under Clayton Act Section 7, and there have been calls for FTC Act Section 5
enforcement against conscious parallelism.”).
61 Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Toward A Dynamic Antitrust Analysis of Strategic Market Behavior, 47
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 101, 117 (2003); Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The
Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1390 n. 31 (1998) (“The high (or low)
point of FTC enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act challenging tacit collusion and oligopoly came
in the late 1970s and early 1980s in three unsuccessful cases against the oil, fuel additives, and cereal
industries. The oil investigation was eventually dropped after years of investigation. The FTC lost the
other two matters. See E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); In re
Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).”).
62 Heinz, 246 F.3d at 725 (quoting 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L.
SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 901b2, at 9 (rev. ed. 1998)) (“It is a central object of merger policy to
obstruct the creation or reinforcement by merger of such oligopolistic market structures in which tacit
coordination can occur.”); FTC Commissioner McSweeny: FTC Must Use All Available Tools to
Evaluate Mergers, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW LEGAL UPDATE W-000-6233 (Sept. 30, 2015)
(“Commissioner McSweeny explained that because antitrust enforcers can do little to remedy conscious
parallelism and other forms of coordination in an already concentrated market, they should use the
coordinated effects theory to predict and potentially prevent tacit collusion. Commissioner McSweeny
noted that the guidelines allow agencies to challenge mergers without specific evidence of how
potential coordination would manifest, and listed market factors that may link higher concentration with
an increased risk of coordination, including: ease of entry or expansion; product homogeneity; market
elasticity; customer switching costs; contract duration; transaction transparency.”).
63 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) (“Legal
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally
disfavored in antitrust law.”).
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parallelism. In the case of ex-post antitrust enforcement, the realization that
tacit collusion may emerge when market conditions are present may
provide an explanation to the parallel conduct and bring it outside the scope
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 101 of the EU’s TFEU.
Accordingly, even when private plaintiffs, the Department of Justice
(DOJ), or European agencies have ample evidence of anticompetitive
parallel behavior, that in itself, will not serve as proof of an agreement or
illicit concerted practice, when the market conditions for tacit collusion are
present.64 Courts instead will assume that tacit collusion is likely and will
require additional proof, which often include evidence of illicit
communication.65 It is only when parallel behavior cannot be explained as
the outcome of tacit collusion (or due to other factors), that it may serve as
proof of illegal collusion. As the European Court of Justice held:
Although parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a concerted
practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it
leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal
conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the size
and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said market.66

It is for the competition agency and private plaintiff to establish that
no other explanation for the parallel behavior is present, which is difficult
to prove in oligopolistic markets.67 This is because the market may display
the conditions for tacit collusion which can explain the parallel behavior.
And so, the case law puts the onus on the antitrust plaintiff to prove the
implausibility of rational unilateral reaction to market characteristics.68 But

64 See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (“The inadequacy of showing
parallel conduct or interdependence, without more, mirrors the ambiguity of the behavior: consistent
with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business
strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.”); Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 1251, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“It is well
established that consciously parallel business behavior does not of itself constitute a violation of the
antitrust laws.”).
65 See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2015)
(“[E]vidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy,” so in
order to “move the ball across the goal line, a plaintiff must also show that certain plus factors are
present,” as these “plus factors are ‘proxies for direct evidence’ because they ‘tend to ensure that courts
punish concerted action—an actual agreement—instead of the unilateral, independent conduct of
competitors.’” The court highlighted “traditional non-economic evidence of a conspiracy as the most
important plus factor,” which looks for “proof that the defendants got together and exchanged
assurances of common action or otherwise adopted a common plan even though no meetings,
conversations, or exchanged documents are shown.”).
66 Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 655.
67 See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360-61 (3d Cir. 2004).
68 See, e.g., Case T‑442/08, CISAC v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:T:2013:188, ¶182 (2013).
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the “most important evidence will generally be non-economic evidence that
there was an actual, manifest agreement not to compete.”69
One example is CISAC v. Commission where the European General
Court quashed a finding by the European Commission that parallel
behavior between collecting societies was the result of illegal collusion
with the aim of dividing the market.70 The Court held that the Commission
did not establish the requisite legal standard of the existence of collusion
between the collecting societies to fix the national territorial limitations.
The evidence relied upon by the Commission was not sufficient to render
implausible the explanation that the national territorial limitations were the
result of individual, carefully considered, and rational decisions, given the
specific conditions of the market and not the result of a concerted
practice.71 The Court held that “the Commission must show precise and
consistent evidence in order to establish the existence of the
infringement.”72 Indeed, it is settled case law that “where the Commission’s
reasoning is based on the supposition that the facts established in its
decision cannot be explained other than by concentration between the
undertakings, it is sufficient for the applicants to prove circumstances
which cast the facts established by the Commission in a different light and
thus allow another explanation of the facts to be substituted for the one
adopted by the Commission.”73
Thus, the case law accepts that absent proof of express collusion or
communication, parallel action and tacit collusion may be the only
explanation of the market outcome.74 Consumers may be harmed by the
69

In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d at 361 (citations omitted).
Case T‑442/08, CISAC v Comm’n, 5 C.M.L.R. 15 (2013).
71 Id. ¶ 95.
72 Id. ¶ 96.
73 Id. ¶ 99.
74 See, e.g., Washington Cty. Health Care Auth., Inc. v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 328 F. Supp. 3d 824, 832
(N.D. Ill. 2018). The court stated:
70

For several reasons, the probative force of plaintiffs’ allegations of parallel conduct is
particularly weak. Chief among them is that the IV saline market is an oligopoly in which
“conscious parallelism”—”a common reaction of firms in a concentrated market that recognize
their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output
decisions”—is to be expected. In other words, absent additional factual allegations, the mere
fact that Baxter and Hospira restricted their own production of IV saline solution output after
learning of output reductions by the other sheds little light on the existence vel non of an
unlawful agreement. Yes, it is possible that Baxter and Hospira’s behavior stemmed from a
violation of the antitrust laws—i.e., that it was the result of an agreement. But the nature of an
oligopoly makes it such that there is a substantial likelihood that—even absent an agreement—
Baxter and Hospira would have tried to capitalize on output restrictions signaled by the other, as
it was in their independent interests to restrict supply and drive up prices. In short, parallel
conduct in an oligopolistic market is not particularly probative of collusion.
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higher prices, yet the law cannot condemn the parallelism as illegal.75 In
other words, the courts and agencies accept that tacit collusion is not only
legal, but likely and sustainable in concentrated industries. Absent proof of
an agreement, the plaintiff cannot challenge the anticompetitive conduct.
In an interesting case from 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit explored price alignment without any actual communications
among the parties. The opinion is noteworthy as its author, Judge Richard
Posner, in his earlier writings, thought that it was “improbable that prices
could long be maintained above cost in a market, even a highly
oligopolistic one, without some explicit acts of communication and
implementation.”76
Nonetheless, writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner accepted
the notion that anticompetitive tacit collusion can occur without any such
communication:
As for the apparent anomaly of competitors’ raising prices in the face of
falling costs, that is indeed evidence that they are not competing in the sense
of trying to take sales from each other. However, this may be not because
they’ve agreed not to compete but because all of them have determined
independently that they may be better off with a higher price. That higher
price, moreover—the consequence of parallel but independent decisions to
raise prices—may generate even greater profits (compared to competitive
pricing) if costs are falling, provided that consumers do not have attractive
alternatives.77

In this case, the action taken by the companies was deemed unilateral
and reflected an economic rationale, in light of each firm’s demand
function.78 The Seventh Circuit recognized that anti-competitive pricing
could arise from purely tacit collusion: “There isn’t even evidence that [an

Id. (citations omitted). See also Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Comm’n, 1972 E.C.R.
619, ¶ 8 (“Although parallel behaviour may not by itself be identified with a concerted practice, it may
however amount to strong evidence of such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do
not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the
size and number of the undertakings, and the volume of the said market.”).
75 See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350,360 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting how the
Supreme Court has described conscious parallelism in dicta as “the process, not in itself unlawful, by
which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a
profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.”).
76 Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV.
1562, 1574 (1969).
77 In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 871-72 (7th Cir. 2015).
78 Id. at 876.
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employee of the defendant] had ever communicated on any subject with
any employee of any of the other defendants.”79 As the court noted,
[T]he Sherman Act imposes no duty on firms to compete vigorously, or for
that matter at all, in price. This troubles some antitrust experts, such as
Harvard Law School Professor Louis Kaplow, whose book Competition
Policy and Price Fixing (2013) argues that tacit collusion should be deemed a
violation of the Sherman Act. That of course is not the law, and probably
shouldn’t be. A seller must decide on a price; and if tacit collusion is
forbidden, how does a seller in a market in which conditions (such as few
sellers, many buyers, and a homogeneous product, which may preclude
nonprice competition) favor convergence by the sellers on a joint profitmaximizing price without their actually agreeing to charge that price, decide
what price to charge?80

The courts assume that “[c]ompetitors in concentrated markets watch
each other like hawks.”81 Each competitor will copy or respond to
competitive responses without necessarily communicating with one
another. And “it is not a violation of antitrust law for a firm to raise its
price, counting on its competitors to do likewise (but without any
communication with them on the subject) and fearing the consequences if
they do not.”82
How does one reconcile the views of the courts and enforcers on the
one hand and the discrete subset of economists on the other hand?
One explanation is that the case law is simply wrong. Tacit collusion
is unlikely and communications are occurring, but the colluders are
effectively covering their tracks. We are presented with a case of a Type II
error (false negative) where courts are dismissing cases when they should
be finding liability.
For example, in the Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, the parties
were embroiled in three years of discovery, culminating in the district
judge’s grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.83 The heart
of the plaintiffs’ case were two emails between two T-Mobile executives.
In the first e-mail, the executive writes, “Gotta tell you but my gut says
raising messaging pricing again is nothing more than a price gouge on
consumers. I would guess that consumer advocates groups are going to
come after us at some point. It’s not like we’ve had an increase in the cost
to carry message to justify this or a drop in our subscription SOC rates? I
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 873.
Id. at 873-74.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 869.
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know the other guys are doing it but that doesn’t mean we have to
follow.”84 The second e-mail -- sent in the wake of a congressional
investigation of alleged price gouging by the defendants – noted said that
“at the end of the day we know there is no higher cost associated with
messaging. The move [the latest price increase by T–Mobile] was colusive
[sic] and opportunistic.”85 Judge Posner summarily disposed of this
“smoking gun” evidence:
the plaintiffs’ counsel demonstrate a failure to understand the fundamental
distinction between express and tacit collusion. Express collusion violates
antitrust law; tacit collusion does not. There is nothing to suggest that [the TMobile executive] was referring to (or accusing his company of) express
collusion. In fact the first email rather clearly refers to tacit collusion[.]86

While some economists doubt the ability to enter and sustain
conscious parallelism,87 the law assumes that it is possible without illicit
communication and does not intervene.
The problem is that if one were to reject the prevailing legal
viewpoint, we may quickly shift to a Type I error (false positive), where
courts reach a positive result (finding the defendants liable for price-fixing)
when they should reach a negative one (finding the defendants not liable
because they never agreed with one another). All the plaintiff would have
to show in markets with more than two competitors is an anticompetitive
outcome – whether by tacit or express collusion. If anticompetitive
conscious parallelism/tacit collusion is considered implausible without
communication, the court would infer communications among the
competitors. Once the court makes this inference, it is a small step to infer
from the unobserved communications -- along with the observed
anticompetitive behavior – an agreement among the rivals, and thus
liability under EU and US law. Under such approach, the distinction
between express and tacit collusion would fade as the agencies, antitrust
plaintiffs, and courts would assume an illegal agreement whenever
observing conscious parallelism with anticompetitive outcomes.88 This, of
84

Id. at 872.
Id.
86 Id.
87 See Schwalbe, supra note 16; Schrepel, supra note 16; Kühn & Tadelis, supra note 16;
Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century Day 1, supra note 16; Transcript of FTC Hearings Session No. 7: Competition and Consumer
Protection in the 21st Century - Day 2, supra note 9.
88 One potential rebuttal is that the antitrust plaintiffs should still have to hunt for evidence of the
communications. But why? When there is fire, why would the court require plaintiffs to prove
independently the existence of smoke? If what you are observing—namely the anticompetitive
coordination—is only possible with communications, then why would the courts require the plaintiff to
85
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course, would send shivers down the defense bar’s and their clients’ spines.
Courts would presume that firms communicated, even when they have not.
And how would they prove that they did not communicate? To avoid
prosecution, firms will be required to operate irrationally in the market.
A second explanation focuses on the misalignment between market
realities and the experimental evidence upon which some economists rely.
According to this explanation, economic experiments, carried in
laboratories with test subjects that interact over a period of a few hours
(and with absolute control over communications), do not necessarily
provide a good proxy for actual market behavior where awareness of
interdependence exists absent illicit communications. The lab experiments
do not reflect the interdependence of tacit collusion (and often discount the
stability of actual collusion). In practice, firms can sustain tacit collusion
without illicit communication as they operate with awareness that develops
over time, as to the market dynamics, and the benefit they may attain from
parallelism and the avoidance of price wars. Firms that operate over long
periods of time in these highly concentrated markets benefit from “industry
awareness” and understand the interdependence among their actions.89 That
awareness emerges from a large number of abstract signals and
observations, none of which triggers antitrust intervention, and can reduce
uncertainty about future actions with long-lasting effects on coordination.
This awareness may substitute communication in a laboratory setting and,
at the very least, provide a plausible explanation to the durable conscious
parallelism.
Whichever explanation one favors, either way – when determining
illegality – the law rejects the argument that communication is essential to
establish tacit collusion. Quite the contrary, the law accepts that when
market conditions for tacit collusion are present, conscious parallelism
yielding anticompetitive outcomes may be sustained. Put simply, tacit
coordination can exist “without any actual communication among
competitors.”90
expend time and resources to prove the communication? In the end, tacit collusion would always violate
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Article 101 of TFEU.
89 See, e.g., Rumina Dhalla & Christine Oliver, Industry Identity in an Oligopolistic Market and
Firms’ Responses to Institutional Pressures, 34 ORG. STUD. 1803 (2013); Margaret Peteraf & Mark
Shanley, Getting to Know You: A Theory of Strategic Group Identity, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 165
(1997).
90 U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comment on Proposed Confidentiality Determinations for Data
Required Under the Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule and Proposed Amendment to Special
Rules Governing Certain Information Obtained Under the Clean Air Act (September 30, 2010), 2010
WL 9440202, at *6 n.3; In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F.3d. 651, 654 (7th
Cir. 2002) (noting that a tacit agreement to fix prices is “an agreement made without any actual
communication among the parties to the agreement”).
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Returning to our discussion of algorithms, the same legal approach
applies. When we raised our scenarios of algorithmic tacit collusion, most
enforcers, judges, and lawyers recognized this possibility. It derived
naturally from the law and market reality that they encountered over the
decades. Moreover, other economists and game theorists accept tacit
collusion without communications.91 But, if one assumes that the skeptics
are right, then the gap between their beliefs and the law has widened. If the
skeptics are right, humans have somehow successfully skirted antitrust
liability for decades by convincing enforcers that parallel behavior can
naturally occur under some market conditions and is not the result of illicit
communications. But because pricing algorithms cannot engage in this
“stealth communication,” algorithmic tacit collusion should be impossible.
If true, then whenever enforcers observe what appears to be conscious
parallelism in markets dominated by pricing algorithms, they have a
stronger case to argue that the humans must have communicated. For any
other explanation is impossible. But the enforcers and courts, to date, have
not adopted this presumption. They recognize the possibility that humans
may engage in illicit communication to limit competition (in which case
they will prosecute them for cartel activity), but also recognize humans and
algorithms may react unilaterally to market dynamics and tacitly collude
without explicit (and illicit) communications.
Another anomaly emerges. If the critics are correct, in industries
conducive to tacit collusion, firms would have little, if any, incentive to use
pricing algorithms. These firms apparently have a golden ticket – they can
charge supra-competitive prices through stealth human communications
without the threat of antitrust liability. So, one would not expect industries
characterized by such tacit collusion – like gas stations – to switch to
pricing algorithms. For if they did, their prices and profits, without the
stealth human communications, would likely drop. If the prices don’t drop,
then one must assume, under this economic theory, that the firms, as in the
Topkins case in the US92 and the Trod and GBE cases in the UK,93 not only
91 See Marc Ivaldi et al., The Economics of Tacit Collusion - Final Report for Directorate General
for Competition, European Commission (Mar. 2003), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/
studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3CS-JYKL]; see generally
6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (3d ed. 2010); FREDERIC SCHERER &
DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed.1990).
92 Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Topkins, No. CR 15-00201 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (pleading
guilty to agreeing with his co-conspirators to fix the prices of certain posters sold in the United States
through Amazon Marketplace, where the conspirators used specific pricing algorithms to implement
their illegal oral agreement).
93 The UK antitrust authority found in 2016 that Trod Ltd. and GB eye Ltd. infringed the
competition law by agreeing that they would not, in certain specified circumstances, undercut each
other’s prices for posters and frames sold on Amazon’s UK website, and used pricing algorithms to
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agreed to collude, but also communicated with each regarding the
algorithms needed to implement and sustain their collusion. Thus, the level
of communications between competitors should significantly increase as
firms switch to pricing algorithms.
Thus, courts and competition authorities have largely marginalized the
“tacit collusion is impossible without communications” arguments. Indeed,
as we discuss below, the emerging evidence justifies the courts’ and
agencies’ skepticism of the skeptics.
III. THE (IM)PLAUSIBILITY OF ALGORITHMIC TACIT COLLUSION
Let us now move to a second, related issue which merits our attention
– whether pricing algorithms can support anticompetitive conscious
parallelism. If we accept the legal premise that conscious parallelism can
occur without the communications that expose firms to antitrust liability,
then the issue is whether algorithms can facilitate tacit collusion, and do so,
in a superior manner to that of humans.
Some contend that even if tacit collusion without communication were
possible in the brick-and-mortar economy when rivals watch each other
like hawks, and react to each other’s pricing and competitive moves, that
does not mean it is possible in industries where prices are set by algorithms
(and perhaps for some firms by humans). The potentially large number of
pricing options presented by algorithms creates complexity, which will
likely decrease the likelihood of alignment in a repeated game – that is,
algorithms will unlikely obtain and sustain tacit collusion. In what follows,
we consider this argument.
Let us start by stating the obvious. This discussion does not concern
“the rise of the machines” nor the creation of “evil” algorithms that seek to
profit at the expense of consumers. It is a somewhat less exciting debate
about the possibility that human-designed algorithms might offer a superior
instrument for the optimization of pricing decisions, in markets that may
support conscious parallelism. In that respect, one should note the limits of
the pricing algorithm. It will not necessarily change the basic
characteristics of every market, nor will it overcome instability that results
from lower barriers to entry, maverick companies, or fierce competition.
The tool at hand, at times, will amplify the power to monitor and punish in
instances when humans see a benefit in sustaining parallel behavior.
When discussing the extension of human will, it is helpful to
distinguish between “simple” adaptive algorithms that are programmed to
facilitate their illegal agreement. See U.K. Competition & Mkts. Auth., CMA Issues Final Decision in
Online Cartel Case, GOV.UK (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-issuesfinal-decision-in-online-cartel-case [https://perma.cc/U9GU-73MG].
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monitor and “react,” and more sophisticated self-learning algorithms that
rely on artificial intelligence to autonomously determine the optimal
strategy. That simplified distinction is of value for our discussion, as it
helps identify instances in which the executives appreciated how their use
of pricing algorithms would very likely foster conscious parallelism (thus,
we have evidence of anticompetitive intent, but not necessarily
communications), and instances in which humans do not intend to facilitate
conscious parallelism through their use of algorithms. Let us explore both
categories.
A. Simple Algorithms
Humans can program adaptive algorithms to reflect a pricing strategy
that assumes interdependence on the market or is geared to push toward
such interdependence. Humans observe the market dynamics and identify
the desirability of parallelism. They subsequently program the algorithm to
reflect the unilateral actions of a rational agent in this tight oligopoly.
Detection and punishment of deviation are imbedded into the algorithmic
pricing decision-making, in addition to the upward price adjustment that
follows the price leader.
In essence, tacit collusion happens at the human level and leads
humans to utilize technology in order to stabilize it. As we saw in Part II,
the law in the US and EU accepts that when market conditions are apt, such
conscious parallelism can be established unilaterally, as humans develop an
awareness of market dynamics and appreciate the interdependence among
the rivals. As a result, the enforcers (other than the FTC) and private
plaintiffs cannot legally challenge the new equilibrium (absent evidence of
express collusion). The FTC can attempt to reach the industry-wide use
algorithms as a facilitating practice.
However, how likely is algorithmic tacit collusion without
communications? To test the dynamic described above, let us start in the
lab. Professors Nan Zhou, Li Zhang, Shijian Li, and Zhijian Wang devised
a Linear Extortion to Collusion Algorithm (LECA) which can “enforce its
human rival to collude.”94 Professors Nan Zhou and his colleagues then
designed an algorithm-human game, where a human competed against the
LECA algorithm for 600 rounds.95 In each round, the human and algorithm
could decide the quantity of a product to produce. Importantly, for our
purposes, they could not otherwise communicate with each other, nor did
94

Nan Zhou et al., Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from
Experimental Economics (Feb. 21, 2018) (unpublished working paper, Zhejiang University),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.08061.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DHQ-MDBP].
95 Id.
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the human know of the algorithm’s pricing strategy. After they each select
a quantity of products they wanted to produce, they were told the human
subject’s and algorithm’s profits. Over the first 300 iterations of the
competition game, the humans learned that reducing quantity to reach the
almost fully collusive level would secure the greatest profits. After learning
this, the humans kept their quantity at the collusive level thereafter. In their
Algorithm-Human duopoly market, the degree of tacit collusion rose to
nearly 100% in rounds 300 to 400. What is interesting is that the time to
establish tacit collusion (about 400 rounds) in the algorithm-human
experiment was far quicker than in the human-human collusion (about 800
rounds) experiments. Using an algorithm that is programed to achieve
conscious parallelism resulted in a superior result than leaving that task to
humans. From their experiments, the study’s authors concluded that first,
algorithms can facilitate tacit collusion more quickly, and second, there
exists incentives for firms to use such algorithms in the market.
That experiment, as the authors recognized, involved a duopoly. Now
let us consider tacit collusion in markets with multiple competitors.
Suppose an oligopolistic gas station market with limited transparency,
such that prices are only visible when reaching each gas station. In this
market, customers can mitigate the search costs by asking friends about any
available deals, visit a few gas stations, and support the station with the
lowest price. Here a gas station, by discounting, may increase its profits
and develop a reputation for having a low (if not, the lowest) price. At
times, competitors, aware of the price reductions and promotions would
respond with their own initiative. Even when the gas prices are more
transparent, there is a lag for rivals to discover the lower price, because of
monitoring time and costs. Their delayed response is likely to benefit the
station with the reputation as a discounter. Under these market conditions,
conscious parallelism is harder to sustain. The firms will likely compete as
expected. We see here how markets “need to be sufficiently transparent to
allow the coordinating firms to monitor to a sufficient degree whether other
firms are deviating, and thus, know when to retaliate.”96 This would
especially be the case where customers are aware of the price, while
competitors do not (for example, when there are significant and frequent
discounts).
When transparency and the rivals’ speed in responding to competitive
behavior increase in concentrated markets with homogeneous goods, so too
does the risk of tacit collusion. With computerized pricing, the process may
be faster and more stable. To foster parallelism, companies may adopt a

96

EC Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, ¶ 49.
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pricing strategy that would be easy to decipher by competitors. Let us
briefly illustrate with two examples.
First, in 2012, petrol stations in Chile were required to post their fuel
prices on a government website and to keep prices updated as they changed
at the pump. An economic study found that this Chilean regulation did not
increase competition.97 On the contrary, the petrol stations’ margins
increased by 10%, on average, following the prices being posted on the
government website.98
Second, in Germany, the government suspected that an oligopoly of
five firms -- BP (Aral), ConocoPhillips (Jet), ExxonMobil (Esso), Shell,
and Total – dominated the off-motorway petrol station business.99 To
promote competition, the government required the petrol stations to report
to its government’s transparency unit any price changes for gasoline or
diesel fuel in “real-time.”100 The government’s transparency unit then
transmitted the price data to consumers, with the aim that they could easily
find the cheapest petrol nearby. One economic study found that rather than
lowering prices, the enhanced market transparency actually increased
prices further. Compared to the control group, retail petrol prices increased
by about 1.2 to 3.3 euro cents, and diesel increased by about 2 euro cents.101
Other studies also suggest an increase in transparency can facilitate
tacit collusion.102
97

Fernando Luco, Who Benefits from Information Disclosure? The Case of Retail Gasoline, 11
AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 277 (2019).
98 Id. The softening of competition was common across brands and was not limited to a single
Chilean city. Interestingly, although the stations’ margins increased across Chile, the effect was not
uniform: the petrol station margins “increased the most in areas with low or non-existent consumer
search (low-income areas), while they increased the least, and even decreased, in areas with high search
intensity (high-income areas).”
99 Fuel
Sector
Inquiry
Final
Report,
BUNDESKARTELLAMT
(May
2011),
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Sector%20Inquiries/Fuel%20Sector%20I
nquiry%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=14
[https://perma.cc/VE74-V289]
(Together, the five companies had a combined share of approx. 64.6% of the annual fuel sales, with the
remainder distributed among “a few other large oil companies and a large number of small and medium
sized oil traders.”).
100 Ralf Dewenter et al., The Impact of the Market Transparency Unit for Fuels on Gasoline Prices
in Germany (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics Discussion Paper No. 220, 2016),
http://www.dice.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_Fakultaet/DICE/
Discussion_Paper/220_Dewenter_Heimeshoff_Lueth.pdf [https://perma.cc/37Z2-RBLG].
101 Id. at 5. More generally, we also note another interesting study on the impact of price matching
guarantee as stabilizing tacit collusive mechanism in petrol markets. See Luís Cabral et al., Learning
Collusion: Theory and Evidence from a Gasoline Market Price Matching Guarantee, CRESSE 1
(March 2018), http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/2018_ps11_pa2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TKF8-XMEN].
102 See, e.g., David P. Byrne & Nicolas de Roos, Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail
Gasoline, 109 AM. ECON. REV. 592 (2017) (finding the systematic use of prices rather than explicit
communication as a tool for tacit coordination); Tabled Paper by Griffith University Submitted to the
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First, these outcomes, which make sense under the legal standard, are
harder to explain under the “no collusion absent communications” theory.
Under this economic theory, the government’s increase in transparency
should not have prompted the rivals to increase prices further. Because
sustaining tacit collusion among five competitors is implausible, in view of
this economic theory, the oligopolists must have been actively
communicating to sustain their supra-competitive pricing. They
conceivably would have communicated their dissatisfaction with each other
after their daily drive.
Rather, the result is consistent with the legal acknowledgment of
sustained tacit collusion where each competitor watches the others like
hawks. To monitor pricing, the gas station owners in Germany would drive
past specified competitor gas stations several times a day and note their
prices. The monitored prices were then fed into the respective gasoline
company’s electronic system. Generally, when one competitor increased its
gas prices, rivals generally would respond between three to six hours
later.103 Now, with increased transparency from the online pricing, the
rivals can monitor and punish promptly.
So, the increase in fuel prices was not the likely result of
“communications.” Instead, it likely reflects tacit collusion, where firms
who are aware of their interdependence, recognize that they will profit by
acceding to the higher price rather than discounting.
With pricing algorithms, the retaliation time is further reduced. As
each firm taps into its rivals’ real-time pricing, no gas station likely profits
Legislative Assembly of Queensland, The Impact of MyFuelNT on retail ULP prices in the Northern
Territory, QUEENSL. PARLIAMENT (May 2018), http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Documents/
TableOffice/TabledPapers/2018/5618T565.pdf [https://perma.cc/VUZ7-5YMC] (finding “that the
MyFueINT scheme had a small but significant positive impact” on retail ULP prices in Australia’s
Northern Territory. Significant anticompetitive price effects were found across Darwin, Alice Springs
and Katherine. As the authors note, the results of the study “should be treated with caution due to 1)
limitations of the data, 2) changes in the sampling methodology 3) omitted variable bias.”).
103 Dewenter et al., supra note 100:
If a round of price increases is begun by Aral, Shell reacts in 90% of the cases exactly three
hours later with a price increase in all of the regional markets, thereby adjusting its price level to
that of Aral. Vice-versa, when Shell starts a round of price increases, in 90% of the cases Aral
follows suit, again after exactly three hours. Total also generally reacts with price rises in all of
the regional markets three or three-and-a-half hours after the start of the price round. Jet and
Esso also react in the same way to rounds of price increases started by Aral or Shell, although
the response patterns differ in some of the regional markets. Nevertheless, it can be concluded
that Jet often also raises its prices five hours after the start of a round of price increases,
whereby it generally observes a price difference of one eurocent/litre to Aral and Shell’s prices.
Esso reacts between three and six hours after the start of a round of price increases. It is also
apparent that on some regional markets Jet and Esso only react to rounds of price increases
started in the evenings on the morning of the following day.
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by discounting. Given the velocity with which the pricing algorithms can
adjust, each gas station will less likely develop among its customers a
reputation as a price discounter. Accordingly, the competitors will have
less incentive to discount.
On the flip side, the algorithms’ velocity of pricing decisions can
shorten the time period for signaling price increases in other industries.
Firms would no longer have to rely on lengthy (e.g., thirty-day) advanced
price announcements, where they wait and see what the competitive
response is to decide whether to actually raise prices and to what extent.
Computers can have multiple rounds whereby one firm increases prices and
the rivals respond immediately and without the risk that the firm that
initiates the price increase will lose many customers to rivals. Essentially,
companies may now need only seconds, rather than days, to signal price
increases to foster tacit collusion.
As we shift from a world where rivals drive around town to see the
price that their rivals charge to a world in which pricing algorithms can
achieve this same price monitoring mechanism within milliseconds, the
human logic to maximize profits remains. Importantly, the algorithms help
effectuate this logic. Needless to say, algorithms will not immunize market
participants from disruptive technologies, entrants, or mavericks. However,
absent such threats, the market participants can use pricing algorithms to
sustain tacit collusion (and do so without entering into any illicit
communication or concerted practice).
In an attempt to further stabilize the conscious parallelism, humans
may use additional means. They could, for example, limit variations in the
design of the algorithms, making it easier to follow. Such unilateral moves,
even when undertaken by several firms, are unlikely to trigger antitrust
liability under current laws, absent proof of illicit communication or lack of
rational (and legal) strategy behind the move. Further, companies may
invest in better tools to observe and imitate pricing decisions executed by
other algorithms. Companies may, for example, introduce price matching
guarantees to further support monitoring as deterrent mechanisms.104 The
unilateral nature of the actions may well leave them outside the realm of
Article 101 of TFEU, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and even, Section 5 of
the FTC Act.105 Going a step further, humans may use algorithms in a more
104 Price match may create an incentive to follow price increases by the price leader. See Cabral et
al., supra note 101, at 2.
105 See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating
that to challenge the facilitating device, like a price matching guarantee, the FTC had to show (1)
evidence that defendants tacitly or expressly agreed to the facilitating device to avoid competition, or
(2) oppressiveness, such as (a) evidence of defendants’ anticompetitive intent or purpose or (b) the
absence of an independent, legitimate business reason for defendants’ conduct).
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aggressive way to decode the strategy used by competing algorithms and
adjust accordingly.106 Depending on the technology used, this might trigger
intervention. But if each company unilaterally decides to use an algorithm
to help decode its rivals’ strategy, then the courts may find it perfectly legal
(if plaintiff cannot prove an agreement or that the companies’ actions
qualify as a “facilitating practice”).107
To avoid the need to invest in decoding competing algorithms,
companies may adopt a different approach and use the same provider for
their pricing algorithm, or alternatively, the same provider for their
dynamic pricing strategies. This move would create a hub-and-spoke
interaction, like the one discussed in the introduction.108 Let us elaborate on
this, using our example of gas stations.
Competing gas stations could use the same company for pricing
decision-making. When multiple players use the same algorithm, data
points, and values, the likelihood for alignment increases. According to the
Wall Street Journal, one example is the market for petrol in Rotterdam,
Netherlands, where a number of petrol stations used the same provider—
the Danish company a2i Systems—for advanced analytics to determine
petrol prices.109 Importantly, note that the provision by the same company
of dynamic pricing services, and the creation of a possible hub-and-spoke
relationship, do not clearly infringe the competition laws. On its website,
the company a2i Systems provides a case study to illustrate how it helped
OK Benzin, Denmark’s leading petrol station owner, avoid a price war:

106 See Michal S. Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 67 (2019)
(noting that “the algorithms is a ‘recipe for action,’ which can be directly or indirectly observed by
competitors”); see also Bruno Salcedo, Pricing Algorithms and Tacit Collusion (Nov. 1, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://brunosalcedo.com/docs/collusion.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K7L-2JXP].
107 Note from the European Union, supra note 12, at 8:

[O]ne could argue that through repeated interactions, two firms’ pricing algorithms could come
to ‘decode’ each other, thus allowing each one to better anticipate the other’s reactions.
However, the case-law is clear that Article 101 ‘does not deprive economic operators of the
right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their
competitors’ . . . Short of signalling . . . it is therefore not obvious that more sophisticated tools
through which a firm merely observes another firm’s price and draws its own conclusion would
qualify as ‘communication’ for Article 101 purposes.
108 On liability for hub-and-spoke conspiracy, see Case C-74/14, Eturas v. Competition Council of
the Republic of Lithuania, 4 C.M.L.R. 19 (2016); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208,
227 (1939); Summary of Commission Decision of 4 February 2015 Relating to a Proceeding under
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA
Agreement (Case AT.39861 — Yen Interest Rate Derivatives), 2017 O.J. (C 305) 10; Tesco v. Office of
Fair Trading [2012] CAT 31 (UK).
109 Sam Schechner, Why Do Gas Station Prices Constantly Change? Blame the Algorithm, WALL
ST. J. (May 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-do-gas-station-prices-constantly-changeblame-the-algorithm-1494262674 [https://perma.cc/UR8H-KX8E].
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“Between 2007 and 2012 the market was characterized by fierce
competition and high volatility. At the peak there were 10 to 20 price
changes a day, and the spread between the highest and the lowest price of
the day could be up to 15 eurocent.”110 In enlisting a2i Systems, the leading
retail network of approximately 700 petrol stations (which accounted for
25% of the Danish retail fuel market), sought “to improve the pricing
analysis and decision process and optimize pricing according to their
overall strategy in order to lower the cost of price wars or better yet, to
avoid them.”111 As the Wall Street Journal reported, the complex algorithm
operated by a2i Systems was tested against a control group which did not
use the system to determine price. The result? “The group using the
software averaged 5% higher margins.”112 For the petrol company, a2i
Systems notes, this “means millions of Euros” more, annually.113
Note that the a2i pricing algorithm was used to lower the cost of price
wars or eliminate them altogether. This is not a case of a2i marketing its
ability to coordinate a price-fixing cartel. That would subject it and the
European petrol stations to civil liability. Rather, it is about the unilateral
use of a decision-making algorithm to soften competition. It is about using
the a2i pricing algorithm to service multiple clients.
The sharing of the same focal point, in our opinion, should raise
concerns in such instances and call for some form of intervention. The
Hub-and-Spoke algorithmic structure brings us further away from typical
tacit collusion, but is yet to be challenged by competition agencies. It is
important to stress that it differs from a cartel being facilitated by a huband-spoke structure.114 (The head of the DOJ in 2018 intimated a potential
criminal case that may inform the legality of this practice.115) Indeed, it is
110

PriceCast Fuel Case Story, A2I SYSTEMS (Nov. 2011), https://www.a2isystems.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/PriceCast-Fuel-Case-Story-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HAB-SRRU].
111 Id.
112 Schechner, supra note 109.
113 Id.
114
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (finding an antitrust price-fixing
conspiracy based on a hub-and-spoke conspiracy theory, where one actor (the “hub”), such as a
distributor, enters into agreements with a number of actors (the “spokes”), such as movie studios, who
are aware that the distributor is entering into similar agreements with each movie studio and that the
success of the plan agreed to depends on the studios all performing in accordance with the agreements).
115 The head of the DOJ Antitrust Division said that the anticompetitive use could take a couple of
forms, either two potential competitors using the same algorithm “as a way of effectuating a pricefixing scheme. . . . We actually have a case that’s a criminal case that is going to be coming to
conclusion in the next two weeks, I think, and then we will make public the use of that, and I believe it
is the first of its kind.” John Eggerton, Delrahim: Criminal Case Against Anti-competitive Search
Algorithms Coming, BROADCASTINGCABLE (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/
news/delrahim-criminal-case-against-anti-competitive-search-algorithms-coming
[https://perma.cc/R4B2-MH62].
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an “incidental” hub-and-spoke, which while not driven by a cartel
agreement, may nonetheless facilitate alignment. The UK Competition and
Markets Authority expressed the greatest concern over this algorithmic
hub-and-spoke structure, “because it simply requires firms to adopt the
same algorithmic pricing model.”116 As we indicated in Virtual
Competition, such incidental hub-and-spoke, while not indicative of a cartel
agreement, could nonetheless undermine competition.
Let us move beyond hub-and-spoke and note how algorithms may be
used to amplify the effects of anticompetitive agreements.
One recent example involves resale price maintenance (RPM), which
is where the manufacturer/distributor agrees with the retailer on what the
minimum price should be for the manufacturer’s product. Absent RPM,
some retailers may discount that product to attract customers and increase
sales. Historically, the manufacturer would monitor and individually punish
retailers that sold the manufacturer’s product below its suggested retail
price. For example, after punishing retailer A, the manufacturer would shift
its attention to retailers B, C, and D. Punishing each offending retailer
increases the manufacturer’s potential risks of antitrust liability, especially
in jurisdictions where RPM is per se (or presumptively) illegal.117
But in an environment in which pricing algorithms are used, the
manufacturer may achieve the same outcome without communicating with
each of the offending retailers. In its e-commerce sector inquiry, the
European Commission found that retailers were increasingly using
automatic software “for price monitoring and price setting.”118 Many,
including the biggest online retailers, are using “pricing algorithms which
automatically adapt retail prices to those of competitors.”119 In this
environment, the manufacturer need not punish every offending retailer.
Instead, the manufacturer would only have to punish one or two significant
retailers that are discounting, and whose prices the other retailers’ pricing
algorithms are tracking and matching. Once these discounters raise their
116

Competition and Mkt. Auth., supra note 26.
RPM is presumptively illegal in Europe and in some states in the US. See A.B.A Pricing
Conduct, Corporate
Counseling, and International Committees, Around the World Enforcement Update on Resale Price
Maintenance
30-37
(July
11,
2016),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/antitrust_law/20160711_at160711_materials.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PDJ4XH2S]; Michael A. Lindsay, Repatching the Quilt: An Update on State RPM Laws, 13 ANTITRUST
SOURCE (Feb. 2014). RPM was per se illegal for nearly a century under the Sherman Act until the
Supreme Court, in a controversial 5-4 decision, subjected it to a more deferential rule of reason
standard. See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
118 European Commission Press Release IP/18/4601, Antitrust: Commission Fines Four Consumer
Electronics Manufacturers for Fixing Online Resale Prices (July 24, 2018).
119 Id.
117

249

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

prices, the other retailers’ pricing algorithms will automatically follow. The
manufacturer’s risk of detection and ensuing antitrust liability is reduced,
due to the more limited communications.120
The Commission observed this anticompetitive dynamic in a 2018
vertical price-fixing case. As the Commission found, because many,
including the biggest online retailers, were using pricing algorithms that
automatically adapted the retail prices to those of competitors, the resale
“pricing restrictions imposed on low pricing online retailers typically had a
broader impact on overall online prices for the respective consumer
electronics products.”121 In effect, the consumer electronics manufacturer
only had to punish a few online discounters, and could be assured that
many other retailers would automatically increase their prices. Thus, even
in industries not susceptible to tacit collusion, one can obtain the same
effect when manufacturers vertically fix prices with one significant retailer,
and the other retailers’ pricing algorithms automatically follow suit.
Consequently, the emerging evidence suggests that enforcers will likely
uncover evidence of anticompetitive human intent in using relatively
“simple” algorithms to sustain tacit collusion without any evidence of
actual communications. After all, tech firms currently promote how their
price optimization software can put an end to price wars before they even
begin.
B. Artificial Intelligence
Now, let us turn to our fourth scenario, Digital Eye, where we raise
the question of whether conscious parallelism could be established by selflearning algorithms without the humans’ express intent or direction. Could
algorithms that are based on reinforced learning provide a superior tool to
sustain tacit collusion? And if so, when left to their own devices, might the
pricing algorithms identify conscious parallelism as a superior strategy?
The question is whether in future markets, where the majority of
pricing decisions will involve minimal human intervention, price levels
may be established above competitive levels – not as a result of express
collusion, nor as a result of humans appreciating the benefits of tacit
collusion (and programming their pricing algorithms accordingly), but
rather the result of action taken by independent learning algorithms that
take account of various data points.

120

Background note by the Secretariat, Hub and Spoke Arrangements, OECD Doc.
DAF/COMP(2019)14 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2019)14/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5KW-EMP6].
121 See European Commission Press Release IP/18/4601, supra note 118.
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We are beginning to see Wall Street firms shift from simpler,
programmed algorithms to machine-learning algorithms that pick the
optimal trading strategy. As The Economist observed in 2019:
Quant funds can be divided into two groups: those like Stockfish [the best
chess game engine programmed with human tactics], which use machines to
mimic human strategies; and those like AlphaZero [Google’s self-learning
computer program that had been given only the rules of chess and then taught
itself how to play], which create strategies themselves. For 30 years
quantitative investing started with a hypothesis, says a quant investor.
Investors would test it against historical data and make a judgment as to
whether it would continue to be useful. Now the order has been reversed. “We
start with the data and look for a hypothesis,” he says.
Humans are not out of the picture entirely. Their role is to pick and choose
which data to feed into the machine. “You have to tell the algorithm what data
to look at,” says the same investor. “If you apply a machine-learning
algorithm to too large a dataset often it tends to revert to a very simple
strategy, like momentum.”
But just as AlphaZero found strategies that looked distinctly inhuman, Mr
Jacobs of Lazard says AI-driven algorithmic investing often identifies factors
that humans have not. The human minders may seek to understand what the
machine has spotted to find new “explainable” factors. Such new factors will
eventually join the current ones. But for a time they will give an advantage to
those who hold them.122

Again, we should start by stressing that the issue is not about
algorithms conspiring against humans, but rather, whether a self-learning
algorithm that is programmed to optimize profit by interacting in a dynamic
environment, may identify conscious parallelism as an optimal strategy and
identify unique means to foster this tacit collusion.
Much is still uncertain as to the capacity of future reinforced-learning
or deep learning algorithms to reach conscious parallelism with no human
intervention.123 Doubts as to learning algorithms’ ability to sustain collusion

122 The Stock Market Is Now Run by Computers, Algorithms and Passive Managers, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/10/05/the-stockmarket-is-now-run-bycomputers-algorithms-and-passive-managers [https://perma.cc/5PXT-HQRB].
123 As the ACCC summarized:

“Machine learning” and related “deep learning” technology enable software to autonomously
improve its knowledge and processes through iteration and experience, without being explicitly
programmed with new information or instructions. This can include:
algorithms that teach machines to learn cause and effect by analyzing samples of data that were
manually labelled in order to highlight clear distinctions between different features of data
(supervised learning)
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refer to their increased sophistication, which could make alignment
difficult. Doubts are also linked to the need and ability of algorithms to
establish a hidden channel of communication, that may address problems of
entering and sustaining collusion.124 While acknowledging current
uncertainty, competition agencies around the world have begun looking
into these developments. The technology is still at its infancy, but it is
important to acknowledge that the tech industry is taking its first steps in
this direction for its algorithms.
From an enforcement perspective, and at a high level of
simplification, one may envisage two outcomes:
1. Outcome 1
If the algorithms are uncapable of autonomously reaching tacit
collusion, humans in markets that tilt toward conscious parallelism would
either train them to achieve that outcome, program them with human
strategies that foster tacit collusion, or refrain from using the algorithms (as
such use, absent any significant offsetting gains and efficiencies, would
reduce profits). Accordingly, in a market where humans appreciate the
benefits of interdependence, and can do so without infringing the
competition laws, they would not introduce uncontrolled disruptors that
could unleash a price war. They will continue using simple adaptive
algorithms.
Indeed, we have not found that in the online context that any thirdparty developer of pricing algorithms that promotes its algorithms’ ability
to unleash and prevail in an all-out price war. If self-learning pricing
algorithms reduced overall profits by destabilizing pre-existing tacit
collusion, competitors would unlikely employ them. Thus, in industries
already susceptible to tacit collusion, companies would ensure alignment of
the learning algorithm with the overall strategy. They would ensure to
exploit the freedom offered to them under the law and unilaterally use
adaptive or simple algorithms. Under this scenario we return to our
previous category of human-driven tacit collusion enhanced by algorithms.

algorithms that try to identify hidden structures and patterns from unlabeled data (unsupervised
learning)
algorithms performing tasks and learning through trial and error (reinforced learning).
ACCC, Digital Platform Inquiry Final Report, ACCC 523 (July 26, 2019),
https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/digital-platforms-inquiry-final-report
[https://perma.cc/NQA3C6WU].
124 For papers dismissing the possibility for algorithm-driven tacit collusion, see Schwalbe, supra
note 16.
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The question is whether such use should be condemned by competition law
or remain unchallenged.
2. Outcome 2
If, on the other hand, self-learning algorithms could solve the
coordination problem through trial- and-error and with no human
intervention, then we face an additional complexity in the form of
undetected and unchallenged conscious parallelism. In such scenarios,
algorithms can learn through experimentation and without the knowledge
of the human executives to shift from competitive pricing rules to collusive
pricing rules and sustain that new anticompetitive equilibrium.
Economists and computer scientists are now exploring this avenue.
Research has already shown how, under certain conditions, reinforcement
learning can sustain cooperation.125 Furthermore, learning algorithms have
been shown to gravitate toward conscious parallelism in simple
oligopolistic setting.126 These observations support the possibility that selflearning algorithms may autonomously establish conscious parallelism with
no human input in environments in which they operate in parallel (rather
than only in simplified environments, in which they face a stable fixedstrategy opponent).
With all the uncertainty and caveats in mind, let us briefly note recent
observations of one group of scholars who have shown that self-learning
algorithms can have the capacity to achieve coordination on the tacit
collusive outcome.127 In experiments with two Q-learning pricing
algorithms, tacit collusion emerged in more than 60% of the cases, and at
even higher levels following sufficient simulation. Importantly, these
results were observed in significantly rich environment with up to 100 price
levels. As illustrated below, forcing a price deviation by one algorithm to
the “Nash Price” (in this experiment, reflecting the static equilibrium price
which would emerge if there was no tacit coordination), led the other Qlearning algorithm to react. Subsequently, both returned to the pre-existing
125 See, e.g., Jacob W. Crandall et al., Cooperating with Machines, 9 NATURE COMM. 233, 233,
240 (2018); Joel Z. Leibo et al., Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND
MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS 464, 469-71 (2017), http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas2017/
pdfs/p464.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HXZ-ZSUQ] (analyzing fruit gathering and wolfpack hunting games,
and illustrating conflict emergence and dilemmas aﬀecting cooperation).
126 See Timo Klein, Autonomous Algorithmic Collusion: Q-Learning Under Sequential Pricing,
(Tinbergen Institute, Discussion Paper TI 2018-056/VII), https://papers.tinbergen.nl/18056.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CB9K-KDPG]; Gerald Tesauro & Jeffrey O. Kephart, Pricing in Agent Economies
Using Multi-Agent Q-Learning, 5 AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTI-AGENT SYS. 289, 301-02 (2002).
127 Emilio Calvano et al., Algorithmic Pricing: What Implications for Competition Policy?, 1 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 155 (2019).
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price level, which represents the tacit collusive equilibrium (which is above
the competitive price, but below the monopolistic (cooperation) price). And
so, the self-learning algorithms identified tacit collusion as an optimal
strategy. When one of the pricing algorithms diverted from that price, the
other algorithm reacted (thus making the diversion unprofitable), leading
both to return to a higher anticompetitive price point, which, if applied in
the real world, would benefit the companies, and harm the consumer.
Importantly, this outcome was achieved without human guidance or
programming.

Source: Calvano et al., Q-Learning to Cooperate128
In an extension of their experiment, Professors Calvano, Calzolari,
Denicolò and Pastorello used three Q-learning algorithms (that is, more
than what some argue is possible for tacit collusion without
communications) in a rich price environment. Their experiment again
found conscious parallelism and increased profitability with short learning
times. The scholars observed how difficult it may be to detect such
algorithmic tacit collusion: “What is most worrying is that the algorithms
leave no trace of concerted action – they learn to collude purely by trial and
error, with no prior knowledge of the environment in which they operate,
without communicating with one another, and without being specifically
designed or instructed to collude.”129
128

Emilio Calvano et al., Q-Learning to Cooperate, Address at the NBER Economics of Artificial
Intelligence Conference 2018 (Sept. 14, 2018), slides available at https://conference.nber.org/
conf_papers/f114616.slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YDF-VA3C].
129 Emilio Calvano et al., Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, VOXEU.ORG
(Feb. 3, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/artificial-intelligence-algorithmic-pricing-and-collusion [https://
perma.cc/6WTL-DAMS].
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Researchers are continuing to experiment the likelihood of algorithmic
tacit collusion in even more complex environments - with increased and
changing numbers of algorithms, increased sophistication of algorithms,
and increased price levels.
As the economist Ai Deng noted, the algorithm in the researchers’
experiments took “an average of 850,000 periods of training to learn to
‘tacitly collude.’”130 While that amounts to less than one minute of CPU
time, he noted that in the real world, the algorithms “learn” after 97 years if
they change prices every hour, and companies may not allow the algorithm
to learn on the job. So, companies will likely first train their algorithms offline, which means they might know of their algorithms’ capacity to collude
and may take steps to enhance it.
We are still early in the development of AI and its application to
pricing decisions. Uncertainty remains as to the operation of future
markets, costs associated with the learning phase, the ability to simulate
and operate in a multi-agent environment, and the likely competitive effects
in different markets as the complexity and diversity of self-learning
algorithms increase.131 Furthermore, developments in the ability of
algorithms to signal,132 monitor, decode and communicate in stealth
mode,133 will affect any future equilibria. But we encourage researchers to
continue to develop algorithmic tacit collusion incubators that model rich
and realistic environments.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
If the current pricing algorithms leave no trace of their concerted
action in the lab, then these self-learning algorithms – when unleashed in
concentrated industries – may escape detection from the unwitting antitrust
enforcer who assumes that this collusion will somehow be detected.
Pricing algorithm suppliers already tout, as a benefit, their clients’
avoiding price wars. If this is real, and not marketing hype, then there are
significant potential profits from algorithms that can foster tacit collusion.
130

Ai Deng, How Concerned Should We Be About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion? Comments on
Calvano et al. (unpublished working paper, NERA Economic Consulting and Johns Hopkins
University) (October 11, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467923 [https://perma.cc/Z7KW-5YGQ].
131 See, e.g., Mary McGlohon & Sandip Sen, Learning to Cooperate in Multi-agent Systems by
Combining Q-learning and Evolutionary Strategy (unpublished working paper, The University of
Tulsa), http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~mmcgloho/pubs/wclc.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9J9-ME37].
132 See, e.g., Jacob W. Crandall et al., Cooperating with Machines, 9 NATURE COMMC’NS 233
(2018); see also Gal, supra note 106.
133 See, e.g., Martín Abadi & David G. Andersen, Learning to Protect Communications with
Adversarial Neural Cryptography (Oct. 24, 2016) (unpublished working paper, Google Brain),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.06918.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HDP-XEJB].
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This would represent an area ripe for further exploration by companies and
developers of pricing algorithms, who, at present, benefit from an emerging
gap in antitrust enforcement that may enable the attainment of higher
profits (without the fear of antitrust liability, which includes in the US,
criminal fines, incarceration, and treble damages for the injured antitrust
plaintiffs).
This emerging gap merits closer consideration by competition
agencies. But algorithmic tacit collusion can be even harder to detect –
especially when the algorithms leave no trace of concerted action. As EU
Commissioner Vestager noted, “[t]he trouble is, it’s not easy to know
exactly how those algorithms work. How they’ve decided what to show us,
and what to hide. And yet the decisions they make affect us all.”134
Likewise, the UK competition authority recognized the “complexity of
algorithms and the consequent challenge of understanding their exact
operation and effects can . . . make it more difficult for consumers and
enforcement agencies to detect algorithmic abuses and gather relevant
evidence.”135 Even if the competition agencies detect tacit collusion, the
current law limits their ability to challenge it.
So, where does this leave us?
If one accepts tacit coordination as a material risk in susceptible
industries, then the competition agencies must develop tools to assess (and
deter) this risk.136 No doubt enforcement action, at times, will be
challenging. After all, condemning rational reaction for market
characteristics would, in itself, distort competition. Condemning it when it
is assisted by bots may lead to a similar anomaly. Identifying, auditing, or
monitoring algorithms may be expensive and illusive. Using means to
affect market transparency, undermine detection, or delay reaction can
undermine the essence of competition.
These challenges should give us a pause. When considering any likely
enforcement action, we must acknowledge the costs of over-intervention.
Yet, the cost of under-intervention must also be acknowledged, especially
when premised on the theory that tacit collusion is implausible without

134 Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner, European Commission, Algorithms and Competition,
Remarks at Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on Competition in Berlin (March 16, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/bundeskartellamt18th-conference-competition-berlin-16-march-2017_en [https://perma.cc/LD5J-HGE5].
135 Note
from the United Kingdom, Algorithms and Collusion, OECD Doc.
DAF/COMP/WD(2017)19,
at
12
(May
30,
2017),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)19/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/P7QA-NJSV].
136 See Note by the European Union, supra note 12, at 9; Note by the United States, supra note 12,
at 6; Note from the United Kingdom, supra note 135.
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human communication. Consumers and enforcers with the current tools
cannot blunt the siren song of profits from algorithmic tacit collusion.
So, what are three things that the United States and other jurisdictions
can do to better understand and deter algorithmic tacit collusion?
The first step is to better understand the risks of algorithmic collusion.
The French and German antitrust agencies conducted a joint research
project to investigate algorithms and their implications on competition.137
The European Commission has also announced a consultation process with
a view towards shaping competition policy in the era of digitization. Thus,
the US, where the FTC and DOJ are both currently investigating the tech
platforms, should coordinate efforts with these other agencies.
Moreover, Germany’s Monopolies Commission in 2018, offered
several additional proposals to better understand the risks of algorithmic
tacit collusion.138 The Commission recommends, among other things, that
the competition authorities systematically investigate markets
with algorithm-based pricing for adverse effects on competition. Sector
inquiries (which the FTC can undertake in the US), should be used more
often to identify markets at risk. Additionally, consumer associations could
be given a right to initiate competition sector inquiries, as they are most
likely to receive information about potentially coordinated prices.
Competition agencies should also have dedicated teams dealing with
algorithmic collusion and other competition issues raised by Big Data and
AI. The Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, for example,
has a Data Analytics Unit to analyze and build its expertise on pricing
algorithms, help conduct market studies, and support the work of the
antitrust agency’s investigations teams and economists.139
After better understanding the risks of algorithmic collusion, the
agencies’ next step is to improve their tools in detecting collusion.
Collusion -- whether express or tacit -- is already difficult to detect. In a
market dominated by algorithms, the dynamic algorithmic price may be the
only ascertainable price. Absent a natural experiment or counterfactual
(such as a similar market without algorithms), enforcers may not readily
discern whether (and why) the market price is too high. Is it the result of
artificial intervention or natural supply and demand dynamics? One key
tool that we discuss elsewhere is developing Algorithmic Collusion
137 Autorité de la Concurrence & Bundeskartellamt, supra note 26. The results of the study were
presented in Paris in November 2019.
138 Biennial Report of the Monopolies Commission under § 44(1) ARC, MONOPOLKOMMISSION
(July 3, 2018), https://www.monopolkommission.de/index.php/en/beitraege/223-concentration-amongcompanies [https://perma.cc/K455-5KZU].
139 Sims, supra note 26.
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Incubators, a computer simulation which takes into account the market
characteristics, demand, and supply, and enables competition officials to
test under what conditions tacit collusion occurs, and the effects and
likelihood of different counter-measures to destabilize this conscious
parallelism.140 Basically, antitrust enforcers should use pricing algorithms
deployed in the field to see pricing levels (and margins) for particular
products. It would be of interest if the agency could inquire how algorithms
responded in their simulations when one competitor exited (or entered) the
marketplace (perhaps informing future merger review).
Third, once the agencies have a better understanding of the risks of
algorithmic tacit collusion, and if the evidence shows that the use of pricing
algorithms enhances collusive market results and obfuscates its discovery,
then the agencies should consider updating current antitrust policies.
Germany’s Monopolies Commission, for example, considers two legal
aspects:
 Reversal of the burden of proof in competition proceedings
with regard to the damage caused by an infringement of
competition law; meaning that the finding of a collusive use
of price algorithms would give rise to the presumption of an
excessive price.
 Far-reaching extension of liability for competition law
infringements to third parties such as IT service providers
regarding the design of price algorithms.
A primary way to deter tacit collusion is merger review. In markets
where pricing algorithms are present and the risk of algorithmic tacit
collusion is great, then the competition agencies should consider lowering
their threshold of intervention and investigate the risk of coordinated
effects not only in cases of 3 – to – 2 mergers, but also potentially also in 4
– to – 3 or even in 5 – to – 4 mergers, and to reconsider the approach to
conglomerate mergers when tacit collusion can be facilitated by
multimarket contacts.141
This may also require the agencies to distinguish their approach to
human and algorithmic tacit collusion. It will likely require a refined
approach that identifies and punishes instances where algorithms are used
to facilitate collusion. A refinement of the approach to signalling may be a
good place to start. Restrictions on certain market manipulations (through
bots that underscore parallelism) may be another. The issue should be
approached in a measured manner, and as part of the continual adjustment
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of antitrust policy to market and technological reality. Failing to do so, may
well lead us to future markets where a competitive price is a mere illusion,
and price optimization is used as code for tacit collusion’s supracompetitive profits.
CONCLUSION
Price-fixing cartels, despite the fines, leniency programs, and in some
jurisdictions, criminal penalties, persist. Enforcers and policy makers
increasingly recognize that their current antitrust enforcement tools are
even more limited in effectively deterring algorithmic tacit collusion.142 The
current tools to combat price-fixing do not materially deter tacit collusion.
And merger review, the primary mechanism to deter conscious parallelism,
is likely misaligned with the true ability of markets to support algorithmic
tacit collusion. As a result, competition will likely soften, and consumers
will pay the price.
As brick-and-mortar shops are closing at a faster rate, as sellers and
buyers migrate to the online world, and as technology, communications,
big data and big analytics reach new highs, the effects of pricing algorithms
will become more prominent. In the digitalised environment, tacit collusion
might turn from being a mere outcome of market characteristics, into a
strategy. While the phenomenon of tacit collusion is limited to markets
with given characteristics, it nonetheless is likely to exhibit greater
durability in an algorithm-driven environment.
So, with that risk in mind, we are encouraged that many policy makers
and competition agencies are not only taking this risk seriously but are
devoting resources to better understand the implications of algorithmic
collusion. While it might not be as glamorous as the dawn raid, their efforts
might deter competitors in devising pricing algorithms that can better
exploit consumers.

142 John Naughton, How do you Throw the Book at an Algorithm?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/04/how-do-you-throw-book-at-an-algorithminternet-big-data [https://perma.cc/FP7H-HPBM].
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